Common Interest Agreement New York

The court found that “Amur shared the documents of the object with the company during this litigation, while in the interest against the [accused] united.” Slip op. 3 (the emphasis is on the focus). However, the “trick” is related to the question of whether the communications that preceded the pending litigation occurred while anticipating litigation. The Court found that the application was not “the normal situation in which the common interest derogation is invoked,” but found that the derogation from the common interest applies. In this regard, the Court stated that “it is useful for civil parties in active litigation with a common interest to be able to share their own pre-judicial preferred communications if such disclosure promotes their common interest in litigation without fear of renouncing.” Id. at 3-4. Therefore, the transaction`s lawyers and the parties to the proceedings should consider in the same way that communications made in these parameters may be identifiable in the event of a dispute following a commercial transaction, particularly with respect to merger agreements, which often require parties to share “privileged” communications. As the federal shutdown enters a fourth week, the impact on businesses and their operations is increasing. To help our customers and other interested parties navigate these developments, below is an update on…

The Court of Appeal found that communications were not privileged because the doctrine of the common interest did not apply. As a result, communications between Bank of America and Countrywide were between different parties and could not have been confidential. Ambac submitted that the sharing of documents between BofA and Countrywide waived lawyer and client privilege and insinuated them into production. The court agreed with Ambac and stated that if there were no pending or pending litigation, the doctrine of the common interest did not apply. [3] The Appeal Division, First Division, set aside the duty to appeal, rejected the duty of appeal and adopted a broader view of the common interest doctrine. [4] “As with any rule, there are exceptions.” Ambac, 27 N.Y.3d with 624. Such an exception is a departure from the common interest. Under this exception, the presence of a third party will not destroy a right to privilege if two or more clients retain a separate legal counsel to advise them on matters of common legal interest. The Court of Appeal set aside. It found that the derogation from the common interest only applies when ongoing or reasonably expected litigation is ongoing. The Court stated: “We do not see the need to extend the doctrine of the common interest to communications made in the absence of litigation during or expected, and all the benefits that may be exposed to such an extension of the doctrine are offset by the considerable loss of relevant evidence and the potential for abuse.” [6] The Court of Appeals noted that the scale and success of business transactions in New York have not suffered, despite twenty years of precedents that limited the doctrine of common interest to pending or pending litigation. We believe that dissent was right: the common interest exception should apply in the transactional context and the rules in the New York state and federal courts should be consistent.

However, even if the Court were not prepared to go that far, it should at least have taken a more nuanced approach on the basis that the common interest derogation applies to the parties to the transaction with respect to matters in which they have a common interest vis-à-vis third parties, whether they are public regulators or private companies whose rights against either party may influence the transaction.